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Re: Additional Comments to the HPNS Parcel G Draft Work Plan, Draft 
Final Work Plan, and "Final " Work Plan 
Dear Ms. Duchnak: 
This letter is to follow up my letter ofFebruary 5, 2019 to Thomas 
Macchiarella and to augment Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice's 
comments to the Draft Parcel G Work Plan ("Draft Plan ") and Draft Final Parcel G 
Work Plan ("Draft Final Plan.") 
We address this letter to you for three reasons. First, having authored the 
Navy's Victim Impact Statement in the Matter of US v. Hubbard criminal 
sentencing, you have confirmed the massive impact of the Tetra Tech radiological 
fraud: hundreds of millions of dollars; a decade-plus of wasted work; and "total lack 
of confidence in the Navy's intentions and ability to conduct a proper cleanup among 
the community." (See Attachment 1.) These are not our words; they are yours. 
You also authored the March 15, 2019 letter to EPA and state regulators 
informing them of the Navy's unilateral decision to scrap EPA's risk calculators 
altogether, as further detailed below. 
On or about June 14, 2019, the Navy released a purported Final Parcel G 
Removal Site Evaluation Work Plan. In it, the Navy continues to refuse to validate the 
protectiveness of the remediation goals in the plan, as further detailed below. How 
does it justify such an open an unapologetic violation of the law? It does not. 
Finally, over the past two-plus years we have attempted to communicate with 
the Navy, first through Derek Robinson. When it became clear Mr. Robinson would 
not reply to our telephone messages, emails and letters, we tried Thomas Macchiarella. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Macchiarella, too, has not accorded us a reply. We have submitted 
detailed comments but the Navy has not once responded to any of them as required by 
law. We first requested a meeting with Mr. Robinson to discuss the fraud we 
uncovered in August 2017; we are still waiting. If you are sincere in your stated desire 
to repair the Navy's relationship with the community, the Navy must take public 
comments seriously and it should meet with us to discuss the deficiencies in the Parcel 
G cleanup plans. 
At the very least, the Navy must publish written responses to all significant 
comments as specifically required by CERCLA in 42 U.S.C. § 9617(b). In not 
replying, the Navy is both flouting the law and proving its disregard of the 
community. 
For all of the reasons stated in our comments on the Parcel G cleanup 
including this one, the Navy must publish a new draft plan which demonstrates it is 
protective using EPA's risk calculators, provide a formal public comment period, 
respond in writing to all comments and revise the plan accordingly. 
Most importantly, the Navy must comply with the public participation 
requirements ofCERCLA. The Navy should recognize its duty to provide an 
opportunity for meaningful public review. It must reply to our comments in writing. 
On a practical level, the community has access to information and expertise on the 
history of the shipyard and the radiological fraud that the Navy does not have. 
For example, the environmental Law and Justice Clinic has conducted a real 
investigation into the extent of the fraud, locating and interviewing former shipyard 
rad workers multiple times over a period of months. The Navy has not even contacted 
the whistleblowers that we have been urging it to interview, unsuccessfully, for more 
than two years. Nor has the Navy interviewed the approximately fifty additional 
witnesses whose names we provided to Mr. Robinson in two batches on January 30, 
2018 and February 16, 2018. 
The Navy refuses to see what the community sees; there is a clear connection 
between a thorough, defensible investigation of the fraud and a thorough, defensible 
radiological cleanup. 
I. The Navy Has Intentionally Thwarted Public Participation 
The Navy has a history of significantly downplaying the extent of the Tetra 
Tech fraud and its impact on the radiological cleanup. Both Greenaction and EPA 
pointed this out in comments to the Draft Plan. 
Similarly, the Navy has consistently mischaracterized the extent of 
participation offered to the public in the cleanup planning process. Derek Robinson, 
for example, told the January 28,2019 meeting ofthe Environment and Reuse 
Committee of the Citizen Advisory Committee ("CAC") that the Navy was completely 
transparent; he claimed it releases everything for the public to review and "there is a 
formal comment period on all decision making." See Attachments 2 and 3, videos of 
Mr. Robinson's statements. 1 
1Attachment 2: "We put it all out there to you- to the public- so you see what we're doing and can 
review it." 
Attachment 3: "There's a formal comment period on all our decision making." 
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Unfortunately, what Mr. Robinson says is not what the Navy does. In fact, we 
have repeatedly requested - in writing - that documents necessary to understand and 
comment on the Draft Plan be provided. We have been rebuffed every time. When the 
Draft Plan was released, for example, we requested the Sampling and Analysis Plan 
("SAP"), which was omitted from the draft.2 So did EPA. The Navy refused. The 
public comment period opened and closed, precluding review and comment. 
The Navy could have released the SAP but chose not to. It was released to 
EPA a mere two days after the public comment period closed, suggesting the Navy not 
only excludes public participation, it does so deliberately. 
Similarly, the Parcel G plans- both the Draft Plan and the Draft Final Plan-
omit any reference to EPA's Preliminary Remediation Goal ("PRO") calculations, the 
basis for estimating cancer risk and setting cleanup standards. By omitting any 
mention ofPRGs in the Draft Plan, or Final Plan, the Navy has deliberately barred 
public comment on the single most important decision in any cleanup: its remediation 
goals. 
EPA has insisted in writing since March 2018, months prior to the Draft Plan's 
release, that the PROs for soil and buildings be included. The Navy has refused for 
more than a year. 
In its answer to the Navy's response to EPA's comments to the Draft Plan, 
EPA wrote: 
The response to General Comment 9 states, "The Navy conducted preliminary 
calculations of the risk using the USEP A's Preliminary Remediation Goal 
(PRO) Calculator and found that the current RGs are within the risk 
management range of 10E-04 to 10E-06." However, documentation that 
demonstrates compliance with the risk management range has not been 
provided. Please provide the PRO calculator documentation that demonstrates 
the current RGs will fall within the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Liability, and Compensation Act (CERCLA) mandate that the excess lifetime 
cancer risk from carcinogenic substances does not exceed the risk range of 10 
Ko4 -10 Ko6. 
Instead of providing PRO documentation, the Navy responded, "The PRO 
calculator documentation will be provided as part of the Five-Year Review process. 
Reference to the preliminary calculations was removed from the response." Rather 
than provide the data, the Navy deleted all reference to it without explanation how 
work in Parcel G could proceed absent proof of protectiveness of the remediation 
goals. 
2 See Attachment 4, my attached letter of August 13, 2018 to Derek Robinson re: "Formal Request for 
Delay in Closing of Comment Period to the Draft Parcel G Removal Site Evaluation Work Plan, San 
Francisco, California, June 2018." 
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The same failure of transparency took place with the FYR. It was released 
devoid of PRG data. EPA again asked that it be included. Again the Navy refused. 
To this day, the PRG calculations have not been released to the public. Yet the 
Navy's contractor told the CAC committee he'd been working on the calculations 
since "early 2017." See Attachment 5, a video of Craig Bias.3 In other words, the 
Navy had the PRG data for more than two years. 
The Navy's acts indicate that the PROs were deliberately withheld from the 
public. The deliberate nature of its actions was confirmed by Mr. Robinson's January 
28, 2019 appearance before the CAC where he repeatedly stated the Navy would not 
release them to the public until after "EPA buyoff." The Navy apparently intends for 
the plan to be a fait accompli before the public even sees the risk analysis, precluding 
public comment. See Attachments 6 and 7, videos of Mr. Robinson.4 
Your March 15, 2019letter to regulators states that "a top priority [is] to 
restore public confidence in the radiological rework and the continued environmental 
cleanup at HPNS." Considering the lengths the Navy has gone to preventing PRG data 
from being reviewed and commented upon, your "top priority" consists of hollow 
words, not positive actions. 
Words are not enough; the Navy can only restore public confidence through 
consistent, transparent and publicly vetted plans. The first step should be submitting a 
new draft plan to regulators including the detailed risk analysis, and subject to formal 
public comment as contemplated by CERCLA. 
In addition, we have called on the Navy for two years to reinstate a Restoration 
Advisory Board ("RAB") for Hunters Point Shipyard, the only former Navy base in 
the Bay Area lacking one. If restoring public confidence is your top priority, restoring 
the RAB should be among your first steps. 
It is appropriate here to dispute one thing your Victim Impact Statement in the 
Hubbard case got wrong, evidencing the Navy's wrongheaded view of the community. 
It states, "The frustrations of these local constituencies have been channeled into a 
strong activist element which has made the Navy's public meetings tense, aggressive 
and explosive." I have attended most of the Navy's public meetings over the past 
several years and have never witnessed any "explosive" moments. No one was ever 
arrested or even detained. Tense? Sometimes. Is anger apparent? Sometimes. But the 
primary reason for that atmosphere is the Navy's history of obfuscation and 
3 Mr. Bias says, "The cleanup goals themselves I began reviewing in earnest in coordination with EPA 
Region 9 and US EPA in early 2017 using EPA's own calculators." 
4 In Attachment 6, Mr. Robinson responds to the question of whether the Navy will release the PRG 
calculations prior to EPA's approval of the Parcel G Work Plan. He states, "It's very important before 
we release any calculations that we have EPA's buyoff on this." In Attachment 7, he repeats, "As I said, 
we have to have EPA buyofffrrst before we believe in the numbers." 
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mischaracterization at those very public meetings. I refer you again to Attachments 2 
and 3, in which Mr. Robinson's exaggeration of public comment opportunities is 
seriously misleading. 
The Navy brought this mistrust entirely on itself. It allowed the fraud to occur. 
Having found only the tip of an iceberg of potentially fraudulent data, it did not even 
bother to look below the surface. It allowed Tetra Tech to investigate itself and 
accepted its whitewash without question. It assured the community - for years -that 
everything was fine until forced to admit there was much more extensive fraud than 
what the Navy admitted. It ignored the whistleblowers and to this day denies any 
responsibility for conducting a comprehensive investigation into the fraud's impact on 
the cleanup despite the community's two-year call to investigate fully. It gave the 
community's demand that all Tetra Tech's compromised data be tossed out a 
figurative back of the hand. It defended Tetra Tech's data even after the Navy's own 
data review found significantly substantial evidence of fraud and other unreliable data, 
in the range of 40%. It continued to defend Tetra Tech until it had no choice but to 
give in when EPA found approximately double the data problems the Navy admitted 
to. In one parcel, for example, there was evidence of sampling irregularities in 97% of 
the samples! 
Only then did the Navy agree to what the community had been asking for all 
along. And despite what should have been a humbling series of events for the Navy, it 
has apparently learned nothing; it has continued to hide critical information from the 
public, intentionally preventing public participation, a violation of CERCLA. 
The "constituencies" you mention are angry and mistrustful because instead of 
learning from the fraud and including meaningful public input from communities that 
have a lot to offer, the Navy continues its arbitrary approach. The Navy cannot treat 
the community with open contempt and repair that relationship at the same time. The 
Navy has to earn the trust of its constituencies. To date, we see no evidence the Navy 
understands that or has done anything concrete in advance of that goal. 
The Navy should treat the community as a resource, not a rabble. 
II. The Navy Must Finalize the FYR Prior to the Final Parcel G Plan 
The Navy has contradictory positions. On one hand, it refuses to present any 
data demonstrating the protectiveness of the Parcel G remediation goals until after the 
FYR. On the other hand, it is pursuing regulatory approval for the Final Plan before 
theFYR. 
The Navy cannot have it both ways. It must either include the PRG data in the 
Parcel G planning or defer seeking final approval until after approval of a Five Year 
Plan in which the PRGs data has been vetted. 
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Since protectiveness will have to be demonstrated in the planning for 
radiological remediation in the rest of the Shipyard parcels, finalizing the FYR first 
makes the most sense; it involves all parcels, not just one. 
In any case, the protectiveness of the cleanup is so central, the Navy must 
provide a formal comment period after the PRG data and all other information bearing 
on protectiveness is made public. 
III. Introducing RESRAD at This Stage of the Cleanup Is Improper 
The Navy, it seemed for a brief moment, finally agreed to EPA's longstanding 
demands. In its response to EPA's General Comment 9 to the Draft Plan, the Navy 
wrote, "The PRG calculator documentation will be provided as part ofthe Five-Year 
Review process." (Emphasis added.) 
However, your March 15, 2019letter to regulators, in a direct reversal of what 
the Navy promised, the Navy revealed it unilaterally decided it will use a Department 
of Energy ("DOE") risk calculator called "RESRAD:" "[T]he Navy has determined 
the RESRAD family of codes contain the most scientifically sound exposure models 
of the available tools and, as such, will be using these codes for determining the 
residual risk from radionuclides." 
EPA has been asking the Navy to provide PRG data since early 2018. It has 
asked in writing at least since March of that year. In the Navy's responses until now-
more than a year later- the Navy never once mentioned RESRAD. It released the 
Draft Parcel G Work Plan in June 2018 omitting a single mention ofRESRAD. 
The Navy also released its FYR without a single mention ofRESRAD. The 
public comment periods for the Draft Work Plan and the FYR both opened and closed 
many months before the Navy first raised RESRAD as an issue, making public 
comment impossible. It withheld this from EPA as well, precluding comment from a 
Federal Facilities Agreement ("FF A") signatory. 
EPA CERCLA guidances have consistently required cancer risk to be 
calculated using the PRGs. However, instead of complying with those guidances as 
required by CERCLA and the FFA, the Navy unilaterally and without any comment, 
let alone reasonable justification, deferred the PRGs to the FYR. 
Your March 15th letter also says the Navy will take unilateral action to 
implement the Draft Final Parcel G Work Plan without EPA concurrence, another 
clear violation of the FFA: "However, to initiate field work the Navy will proceed 
with finalizing the Work Plan using the release criteria established by the current 
Record of Decision (ROD)." (p. 1.) 
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The Navy never mentioned RESRAD in the Draft Plan, Draft Final Plan or 
FYR. Nor did the Navy raise RESRAD in any of its responses to comments to the 
Draft Plan and FYR. If the Navy intends to provide the PRG data as part of the FYR, it 
will presumably do so in the near future as the FYR is seriously late. As shown below, 
RESRAD is inconsistent with CERCLA' s requirements. 
A. Using RESRAD to Calculate Risk Conflicts with EPA Guidances, 
Violating both CERCLA and the FFA 
The Navy is required to comply with EPA's CERCLA guidances. RESRAD is 
inconsistent with CERCLA' s requirements and EPA guidances. 
CERCLA section 120, 42 U.S.C. § 9620, requires federal agencies and 
departments to comply with "all guidelines, rules, regulations, and criteria" set by the 
EPA Administrator. Subsection 9620(a)(2) states, in part that, "[n]o department, 
agency, or instrumentality of the United States may adopt or utilize any such 
guidelines, rules, regulations, or criteria which are inconsistent with the guidelines, 
rules, regulations, and criteria established by the Administrator under this chapter." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In addition to the statutory requirement, Paragraph 6.1 of the FF A requires that 
the Navy's cleanup be performed "in accord with CERCLA [and] CERCLA 
guidances." 
EPA released the CERCLA guidance, Radiation Risk Assessment at CERCLA 
Sites: Q&A on June 13, 2014, "Q&A ")making recommendations for how to conduct 
radiological risk assessments. Appendix A, to the Q&A is entitled, "EPA's 
Recommended Guidance for Radiation Risk Assessment at CERCLA Remedial 
Sites." It lists the following twelve guidances: 
• The Preliminary Remediation Goals (PRGs)for Radionuclides 
electronic calculator, known as the Rad PRG calculator (U.S. EPA 
2002a). 
• The Building Preliminary Remediation Goals for Radionuclides 
(BPRG) electronic calculator (U.S. EPA 2007). 
• The Radionuclide Outdoor Surfaces Preliminary Remediation Goals 
(SPRG) electronic calculator (U.S. EPA 2009a). 
• Soil Screening Guidance for Radionuclides (Rad SSG) at CERCLA 
sites (U.S. EPA 2000a, 2000b). 
• ARAR Dose Compliance Concentrations for Radionuclides (DCC) 
electronic calculator (U.S. EPA 2004a). 
• ARAR Dose Compliance Concentrations for Radionuclides in 
Buildings (BDCC) electronic calculator (U.S. EPA 2010a). 
• ARAR Radionuclide Outdoor Surfaces Dose Compliance 
Concentrations for Radionuclides (SDCC) electronic calculator (U.S. 
EPA 2010b). 
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• Chapter 10, "Radiation Risk Assessment Guidance" Risk Assessment 
Guidance for Superfund: Volume I- Human Health Evaluation 
Manual (Part B, Development of Risk-based Preliminary Remediation 
Goals, commonly called and referred to herinafter as "RAGS," Parts 
A and B (U.S. EPA 1989a). 
• Chapter 4, "Risk-based PROs for Radioactive Contaminants," of 
RAGS Part B (U.S. EPA, 1991a). 
• Appendix D, "Radiation Remediation Technologies," of RAGS Part C 
(U.S. EPA 1991b). 
• RAGS Part D, Standardized Planning, Reporting, and Review of 
Superfund Risk Assessments (U.S. EPA, 1998a), and 
• Superfund Radiation Risk Assessment and How You Can Help: An 
Overview (U.S. EPA, 2005a). 
No RESRAD calculators are among those listed in the Q&A 's Appendix A. 
Using RESRAD in setting remediation goals is inconsistent with EPA 
guidance for numerous reasons and violates§ 9620(a)(2). 
1. RESRAD Was Developed as a Dose-Based Model While 
CERCLA is a Risk-Based Model 
RESRAD was developed by the Argonne National Laboratory for the 
Department of Energy ("DOE"). It is a dose-based risk model; it is measured in 
millirem per year ("mrem/yr"). 5 CERCLA cleanup goals, by contrast, have always 
been risk-based. They are measured in excess cancers per unit of population, 
generally, one-excess cancer per million people. 
Multiple EPA's guidances going back many years have stated explicitly that 
dose-based models like RESRAD are not appropriate for CERCLA cleanups, and that 
the risk-based PRG model should be used. 
In 1991, for example, EPA released a guidance called "Risk Assessment 
Guidance for Superfund: Volume I- Human Health Evaluation Manual (Part B, 
Development of Risk-based Preliminary Remediation Goals), commonly referred to as 
"RAGS." 6 The very name of the guidance uses the words "risk-based." In the 
intervening years, EPA has revised its risk-assessment guidances, but has remained 
consistent that CERCLA remediation goals are to be risk-based. 
5 We understand that RESRAD's capabilities were later expanded at the request of the NRC to add a 
risk-based option; the DOE still sets its cleanup levels under the dose-based algorithm and is not 
commonly used according to our understanding, in favor of PRGs. When we ran RESRAD-Onsite, it 
was not readily apparent how to change from dose-based to risk-based calculations. 
6 EPA/540/R-92/003, Publication 9285.7-018, December 1991. 
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In 1999, EPA released Radiation Risk Assessment at CERCLA Sites: Q & A 
(" 1999 Q & A"). 7 Its endorsement of risk-based models is clear and is reiterated 
throughout, starting with its cover letter, which refers to risk, not dose: "Cleanup 
should generally achieve a cumulative risk within the 10-4 to 10-6 carcinogenic risk 
range based on the reasonable maximum exposure." The cover letter also carves out a 
limited exception for dose-based assessments and specifically rejects Department of 
Energy ("DOE") and Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") guidances: 
This Risk Q&A clarifies that, in general, dose assessments should only be 
conducted under CERCLA where necessary to demonstrate ARAR 
compliance.8 Further, dose recommendations (e.g., guidance such as DOE 
Orders and NRC Regulatory Guides)9 should generally not be used as to-be-
considered material (TBCs). Although in other statutes EPA has used dose as a 
surrogate for risk, the selection of cleanup levels for carcinogens for a 
CERCLA remedy is based on the risk range when ARARs are not available or 
are not sufficiently protective. Thus, in general, site decision-makers should 
not use dose-based guidance rather than the CERCLA risk range in developing 
cleanup levels. (Emphasis added, p.2.) 
EPA's 1999 Q&A cover letter goes on to emphasize: 
In a policy statement to its regional offices that perform Superfund cleanups, 
EPA's Headquarters stated that " ... site decision-makers should not use dose-
based 
guidance rather than the CERCLA risk range in developing cleanup levels. 
(Emphasis added p.2.) 
Question 15 in the 1999 Q&A asked: "What calculation methods or 
multimedia radionuclide transport and exposure models are recommended by 
EPA for Superfund risk assessments?"10 The answer starts by referring to risk-
based cleanup goals: "Currently, only the equations in RAGS Part B (U.S. EPA, 1991 
a)- which are used to develop risk-based preliminary remediation goals for hazardous 
chemicals and radionuclides - are recommended by EPA for Superfund radiation risk 
assessments." 
Similarly, Question 32 underlines EPA's partiality for risk-based rather than 
dose-based assessments: 
Risks should be characterized in standard Agency risk language consistent 
with CERCLA guidance. Cleanup levels not based on an ARAR should be 
7 Directive 9200.4-31P, EPA 540/99/006, December 1999. 
8 "Applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements, or ARARs are state-set cleanup goals. 
9 Answer 34 also repudiates another NRC cleanup level as well: "It should be noted that the Agency 
has determined that the NRC decommissioning requirements (e.g., 25, 100 mrem/yr dose limits) 
under 10 CFR 20 Subpart E should generally not be used to establish cleanup levels under 
CERCLA, even when these regulations are ARARs." (Emphasis in original.) 
10 All questions in the Q&A are rendered in bold type. We maintain that format. 
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based on the carcinogenic risk range (generally104 to with 10-6 as the 
point of departure and 1 x 10-6 used for PRGs) and expressed in terms of 
risk ( # X 1 o-#). (Emphasis in original.) 
The 1999 Q&A was updated in 2014 ("2014 Q&A ''). Its treatment of risk-
based and dose-based models, however, was not among the changes made to the 
earlier version. But by the time the 2014 Q&A was issued, RAGS Part B had been 
supplanted as the risk-calculation guidance by the PROs. This could not be stated any 
more clearly in response to Question 16: "The PRO calculators (U.S. EPA 2002a, 
2007, 2009a), which are used to develop risk-based PROs for radionuclides, are 
recommended by EPA for Superfund remedial radiation risk assessments." 
The Parcel 0 remedial goals adopted in the ROD were not dose-based ARARs; 
ARARs do not apply to the Shipyard. Rather, remediation goals at HPNS are to be set 
to meet the EPA's risk range, with 10-6 as the starting point and 104 being the floor. In 
short, RESRAD, as a dose-based model, is inconsistent with EPA's longstanding 
requirement- spelled out in guidances and directives since 1991 - that cleanup 
standards be risk-based. 
a. Dose Assessments and Exposure Rates Are Only Useful 
for Limited Purposes, Not Site Characterization 
i. Dose Assessments 
As quoted from the 1999 Q&A cover letter above, EPA only uses dose 
assessments for the limited purpose of complying with state requirements that 
explicitly require dose-based risk assessment. Such is not the case here. 
Question 32 ofthe 1999 Q&A asks "When should a dose assessment be 
performed?" The guidance replies: 
OSWER Directive 9200.4- 18(US. EPA 1997a) specifies that cleanup levels 
for radioactive contamination at CERCLA sites should be established as they 
would for any chemical that poses an unacceptable risk and the risks should be 
characterized in standard Agency risk language consistent with CERCLA 
guidance "Cleanup levels not based on an ARAR should be based on the 
carcinogenic risk range (generally 104 to 10-6, with 10-6 as the point of 
der,arture and I xI 0-6 used for PRGs) and expressed in terms of risk(# x 
10 ). 
Furthermore, Answer 32 to the 1999 Q&A states, "In general, dose assessment 
used as a method to assess risk is not recommended at CERCLA sites." The answer 
specifies, "At CERCLA sites dose assessments should generally not be performed 
to assess risks or to establish cleanup levels except to show compliance with an 
ARAR that requires a dose assessment (e.g., 40 CFR 61 Subparts Hand I, and 10 
CFR 61.41 )."(Emphasis in original.) 
10 
The 2014 Q&A repeats the portion ofthe 1999 Q&A 's Answer 32 quoted 
above word for word, illustrating that EPA's 2014 update did not alter its preference 
for risk-based remediation goals, not dose-based. 
The 2014 Q&A discusses dose assessments in Answer 33: 
Dose assessments should be conducted during CERCLA remedial responses 
only when 
considering compliance of clean up plans with dose-based ARARs. As 
discussed in 
OSWER Directive 9200.4-18 (U.S. EPA 1997a), cleanup levels for radioactive 
contamination at remedial sites should be established as they would for any 
chemical that 
poses an unacceptable risk and the risks should be characterized in standard 
Agency risk 
language consistent with CERCLA guidance for remedial sites. Thus, cleanup 
levels not 
based on an ARAR should be based on the carcinogenic risk range 
(generally 10-4 to 
10-6, with 10-6 as the point of departure and 1 x 10-6 used for PRGs) and 
expressed in terms of risk(# x 10-#). 
i. Exposure Rates 
Addressing exposure rates, Question 33 ofthe 1999 Q&A asked: "How and 
when should exposure rate be used to estimate radionuclide risks?" It answers: 
"As discussed previously (see Q24 and Q27), EPA recommends that estimates of 
radiation risk should be derived using slope factors, in a manner analogous to 
that used for chemical contaminants." (Emphasis in original, slope factors are 
further addressed below.) 
Answer 33 allows for the use of exposure rates, but only for preliminary 
assessments, not site characterization: 
The principal benefits of exposure rate measurements is the speed and 
convenience of analysis, and the elimination of potential modeling 
uncertainties. However, these data should be of radionuclides concentrations in 
environmental in conjunction with, rather than instead of. characterization data 
media to obtain a complete picture of potential site-related risks. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The answer also stresses, in bold type, that basing risk calculations on 
exposure rate can only be an adjunct to risk-based models like the PROs: "However, 
there may be circumstances where it is desirable to also consider estimates of risk 
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based on direct exposure rate measurements of penetrating radiation." The three listed 
exceptions have nothing to do with setting final cleanup standards demonstrated to be 
protective: 
• During early site assessment efforts when the site manager is attempting to 
communicate the relative risk posed by areas containing elevated levels of 
radiation, 
• As a real-time method for indicating that remedial objectives are being met 
during the conduct of the response action. The use of exposure rate 
measurements during the conduct of the response actions may not decrease the 
need for a final status survey. 
• When risk estimates developed during a risk assessment may underestimate 
the level of risk posed by radionuclides. An example of this situation would be 
where the source of the radiation is highly irregular (inside a contaminated 
structure) instead of being an 
infinite plane, which is the standard assumption used during risk assessments. 
Even where one of these narrow exceptions might apply, the guidance 
emphasizes the limitations of the approach: "In most cases, more accurate estimation 
of radiation risks will require additional site characterization data, including 
concentrations of all radionuclides of concern in all pertinent environmental media." 
b. EPA Guidance Endorses Slope Factors; Conversion 
Factors Have Limited Application 
Slope factors are used to estimate incremental cancer risks. The PROs use 
them. RESRAD, as a dose-based model, calculates that incremental risk using dose 
conversion factors. As discussed below, translating dose to risk is not a simple, 
straightforward matter. 
The 1999 Q&A defined slope factors in Answer 20: 
EPA has developed slope factors for estimating incremental cancer risks 
resulting from exposure to radionuclides via inhalation, ingestion, and external 
exposure pathways. Slope factors for radionuclides represent the probability of 
cancer incidence as a result of a unit exposure to a given radionuclide averaged 
over a lifetime. It is the age-averaged lifetime excess cancer incident rate per 
unit intake (or unit exposure for external exposure pathway) of a radionuclide 
(U.S. EPA 1989a). 
Answer 21 defined dose conversion factors: "Dose conversion factors (DCFs), 
or 'dose coefficients', for a given radionuclide represent the dose equivalent per unit 
intake (i.e., ingestion or inhalation) or external exposure of that radionuclide. These 
DCFs are used to convert a radionuclide concentration in soil, air, water, or foodstuffs 
to a radiation dose." 
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Or, as the 1999 Q&A says in Answer 31, "Slope factors for both radionuclides 
and chemicals are used to estimate incremental cancer risk. " 
The 2014 Q&A handles slope factors quite similarly as its earlier version but 
with more current references. Answer 21 in the 2014 Q&A states: "EPA has developed 
slope factors for estimating incremental cancer risks resulting from exposure to 
radionuclides via inhalation, ingestion, and external exposure pathways," and "EPA 
recommends the slope factors that are used in the PRO calculators for CERCLA 
remedial radiation risk estimates (U.S. EPA 2002a, 2007, and 2009a)." This 
recommendation is repeated in response to Questions 25 and 3 7. 
Question 24 tackles the two calculations head on: "How should radionuclide 
slope factors and dose conversion factors be used?" The guidance answers: 
EPA recommends that radionuclide slope factors be used to estimate the 
excess cancer risk resulting from exposure to radionuclides at 
radiologically contaminated sites for comparison with EPA's target risk 
range (i.e., I o-4 to 10"6 lifetime excess cancer risk). (Emphasis in original.) 
Answer 24 states the limited utility of dose conversion factors: "The primary 
use of DCFs should generally be to compute doses resulting from site-related 
exposures for comparison with radiation protection standards and dose limits (see 3 31-
32) that are determined to be ARARs or TBCs." But using dose conversion factors to 
convert dose to risk is anything but straightforward: "[N]o simple and direct 
conversion between radiation dose and radiogenic cancer risk is available ... 
Therefore, any conversion between dose and risk now must be performed on a 
radionuclide- and pathway specific basis." 
The 2014 Q&A includes identical language to that quoted above from the 1999 
Q&A 's concerning slope factors and dose conversion factors (though in the 2014 Q&A 
it is Answer 25). 
The PROs use slope factors. Since RESRAD substitutes dose conversion 
factors it is inconsistent with EPA guidances and therefore violates both CERCLA and 
the FFA. 
2. The PRGs Use A More Protective Maximum Dose than 
RESRAD 
Even if RESRAD could otherwise be appropriately applied to the cleanup, it 
cannot be used because it is less protective than EPA CERCLA guidances allow. 
RESRAD uses a decades-old old standard, 25 mrem/yr, as the default maximum dose. 
However, while that default has remained constant, EPA has twice lowered the 
maximum allowable dose, first from 25 mrem/yr to 15 mrem/yr and then, in 2014, 12 
mrem/yr. 2014 Q&A, Question 35. 
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Although RESRAD defaults can be changed to reflect maximum doses lower 
than 25 mrem/yr, only experienced users of RESRAD would be knowledgeable 
enough to know that the default needs to be reset. When we ran RESRAD-Onsite, it 
required searching through subscreeens to find how to change the default dose. Thus, 
RESRAD is hardly user-friendly. In contrast, when we ran the PROs calculators we 
found them to be much easier to navigate, an important benefit to community 
members. 
EPA guidance recommends against using other federal agencies' dose 
recommendations for CERCLA purposes. The Q&A, for example answers Question 
36, "Should dose recommendations from other federal agencies be used to assess 
risk or establish cleanup levels?" The answer is "Generally, no." It goes on to say: 
Dose level recommendations from international and other non-EPA 
organizations are not enforceable and therefore cannot be ARARs. The 
selection of cleanup levels for carcinogens for CERCLA remedy selection 
purposes should be consistent with the NCP and CERCLA guidance - i.e., 
based on the risk range when ARARs are not available or are not sufficiently 
protective. EPA has made the policy decision to use the NCP's risk range in 
developing cleanup levels for radionuclides at CERCLA remedial sites rather 
than using dose-based guidance since the use of dose-based guidance. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Furthermore, dose based risk models like RESRAD introduce an additional 
complication in estimating risk, the extra step of having to apply dose-to-risk 
conversion factors. This conversion unnecessarily introduces additional uncertainty 
into the calculation of risk. The PROs, as risk-based models, do not. 
3. The PRGs Treat Chemical and Radiological Risks Uniformly; 
RESRAD Does Not11 
CERCLA guidances like the 1999 Q&A make clear that all onsite 
contaminants must be treated consistently: 
Using dose-based guidance would result in unnecessary inconsistency 
regarding how radiological and non-radiological (chemical) contaminants are 
addressed at CERCLA sites. These reasons include: (1) estimates of risk from 
a given dose estimate may vary by an order of magnitude or more for a 
11 The RESRAD codes used to include RESRAD-Chem for chemical contamination and RESRAD-
Baseline, which RESRAD's website says was useful in "evaluating radiation dose and chemical risk to 
a human receptor based on measured contaminant concentrations in different environmental media. The 
calculations follow the EPA Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (RAGS)." It appears that at one 
time, RESRAD placed value in a unitary model for assessing both chemical and radiological cancer risk 
but apparently no longer does. It is also instructive that RESRAD-Baseline followed EPA's risk model, 
RAGS, but the current RESRAD-Onsite does not reference its improvement, the PRGs; the Onsite 
user's manual does not mention either RAGS or PRGs. See http://resrad.evs.anl.gov/. 
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particular radionuclide, and; (2) dose based guidance generally begins an 
analysis for determining a site-specific cleanup level at a minimally acceptable 
risk level rather than the 10"6 point of departure set out in the NCP. 
Answer 16 states, "To avoid unnecessary inconsistency between 
radiological and chemical risk assessment at the same site, users should generally 
use the same model for chemical and radionuclide risk assessment. (Emphasis in 
original.) 
Likewise, Answer 27 says, "Risks from radionuclide exposures should be 
estimated in a manner analogous to that used for chemical contaminants." The Q&A 
explained why in answer to Question 10, How does the exposure assessment for 
radionuclides differ from that for chemicals? 
Exposure assessment for radionuclides is very similar to that for chemicals. 
Both nonradioactive chemical assessments and radionuclide assessments 
follow the same basic steps--i.e., characterizing the exposure setting, 
identifying exposure pathways and potential receptors, estimating exposure 
point concentrations, and estimating exposures/intakes. 
The 2014 Q&A underscores and amplifies EPA's preference for unitary 
treatment of chemical and radiological risks by repeating verbatim the language 
quoted above from the Q&A 's. In fact, the new version added more explicit language: 
EPA has made the policy decision that risks from radionuclide exposures at 
remedial sites should be estimated in the same manner as chemical 
contaminants, which is consistent with EPA's remedial program implementing 
guidance (e.g., EPA 1997g, 1999d, 2000f). Consequently, approaches that do 
not follow the remedial program's policies and guidance should not be used at 
CERCLA remedial sites. (Question 10, emphasis added.) 
Question 27 asked: How should radionuclide risks be estimated? It replies: 
Risks from radionuclide exposures should be estimated in a manner analogous 
to that used for chemical contaminants. That is the estimates of intakes by 
inhalation and ingestion and the external exposure over the period of exposure 
estimated for the land use (e.g., · 30 years residential, 25 years 
commercial/industrial) from the exposure assessment should be coupled with 
the appropriate slope factors for each radionuclide and exposure pathway. Only 
excess cancer risk should be considered for most radionuclides (except for 
uranium as discussed in Q25). The total incremental lifetime cancer risk 
attributed to radiation exposure is estimated as the sum of the risks from all 
radionuclides in all exposure pathways. 
Second, the risks of all onsite contaminants must be summed to assess total 
risk. Question 28 is: "Should radionuclide and chemical risks be combined?" The 
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answer starts, "Yes. Excess cancer risk from both radionuclides and chemical 
carcinogens should be summed to provide an estimate of the combined risk 
presented by all carcinogenic contaminants as specified in OSWER directive 
9200.4-18 (U.S. EPA 1997a). 
Although both versions of the Q&A repeatedly state the preference for unitary 
treatment of risks, it allows for other approaches, but only in limited circumstances: 
Answer 16 to the 1999 Q&A states: 
To avoid unnecessary inconsistency between radiological and chemical risk 
assessment at the same site, users should generally use the same model for 
chemical and radionuclide risk assessment. If there is a reason on a site-
specific basis for using another model justification for doing so should be 
developed. The justification should include specific supporting data and 
information in the administrative record. The justification normally would 
include the model runs using both the recommended EPA PRO model and the 
alternative model. (Emphasis added.) 
This, too, is repeated verbatim in the 2014 Q&A. 
In other words, if the Navy seeks to substitute RESRAD for the PROs, it still 
has to submit the PRO data for comparison in order to be consistent with the EPA 
guidance so that the EPA and the public can have confidence in the total onsite risk 
from all contaminants. 
The PRO calculators treat both chemical and radiological risks alike, 
significantly simplifying calculation of aggregate risk from both, as required in setting 
remediation goals. RESRAD does not. Because RESRAD treats risk from chemical 
contamination using a very different model than risk from radiological contamination, 
using RESRAD would introduce an additional layer of potential error. 
4. The PRGs and RESRAD Use Different Exposure Models 
There are significantly different exposure assumptions used in RESRAD and 
the PROs, making them incompatible. For example, the PROs use "reasonable 
maximum exposure" ("RME") as the standard for measuring exposure, whereas 
RESRAD uses the less protective "maximally exposed individual" ("MEl"). 
Like the PROs, EPA's longstanding policy is to use RMEs. As far back as 
1990, EPA wrote: "EPA will continue to use the reasonable maximum exposure 
scenario in risk assessment, although EPA does not believe it necessary to include it as 
a requirement in the rule." 55 FR 8710 (March 8, 1990). 
As stated above, EPA published the Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: 
Volume I- Human Health Evaluation Manual, commonly called "RAGS''. RMEs are 
referenced in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. MEis are not even considered. 
16 
The 1999 Q&A reinforced EPA's endorsement of reasonable maximum 
exposure to estimate risk. The cover letter says: "Cleanup should generally achieve a 
cumulative risk within the 10-4 to 1 o-6 carcinogenic risk range based on the 
reasonable maximum exposure." 
Question 29 asks, "How should risk characterization results for 
radionuclides be presented?" The guidance says, "The reasonable maximum 
exposure (RME) estimate of individual risk typically presented in Superfund risk 
assessments represents a measure of the high-end individual exposure and risk." 
However, other models can be used in addition to the RME. "While the RME estimate 
remains the primary scenario for risk management decisions, additional risk 
descriptors may be included to describe site risks more fully." 
In answering Question 30, "Should the collective risk to populations be 
estimated along with that to individual receptors?" the 1999 guidance states, 
"Population risk is generally not used as part of Superfund risk assessments." 
The 2014 Q&A addresses the collective versus individual risk in its Question 
31: "Is it necessary to present the collective risk to populations estimated 
along with that to individual receptors?" 
Generally, no. Risk to potential RME individual receptors generally is the 
primary measure of protectiveness under the CERCLA remedial process (the 
target range of 1 0"6 to 1 o-4 lifetime excess cancer risk to the RME receptor). 
5. RESRAD and Peer Review 
EPA has subjected its calculators to rigorous, independent peer review. It is 
our understanding that RESRAD has not been subject to the same level of scrutiny and 
validation. However, there are EPA documents currently unavailable to us that we 
need to ascertain the details ofRESRAD's peer review. We are preparing a FOIA 
request to EPA seeking those documents. 
Despite this handicap, the DOE's Director of Regulatory Compliance, Robert 
Seifert, gave a July 11, 2018 PowerPoint presentation, DOE Guidance on 
Applicability of RESRAD and the P RGIDCC Calculator for CERCLA Sites. Slide 7, 
attached hereto as Attachment 8, indicates that RESRAD has not been peer reviewed 
recently. Of the six studies cited that are dated, two were done in 1994, another two 
were from 1996 and the final two are dated 2003 and 2011. 
Although we are not yet in a position to document the state ofRESRAD's peer 
review, the Navy certainly is. It is incumbent on it to establish that RESRAD has been 




The Navy must hold the Parcel G planning process in abeyance until after the 
Five Year Review. In the meantime, the Navy must release a new draft plan for Parcel 
G that includes the PRG calculations demonstrating protectiveness and provide for 
formal public comment, respond in writing to all comments and alter the plan 
accordingly. 
Furthermore, there has been a fundamental change in what was contemplated 
in the Parcel G ROD, supplemented by the aggregation of significant change. 
Anything less than a formal amendment to the Parcel G ROD will fail to acknowledge 
the dire impact the fraud has had on the cleanup. 
Without a new draft plan for Parcel G, including risk data substantiating 
protective cleanup goals, the Navy will violate CERCLA and be acting arbitrarily and 
capriciously. Moreover, it will also violate CERCLA if the Navy finalizes the FYR 
without certifying protectiveness. 
We have raised very serious matters. We request that you meet with us to 
discuss them at your earliest availability and, in any event, prior to finalizing the Draft 
Final Plan and/or FYR. 
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